Interview

Astranis signs geostationary satellite deal with Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom as undersea cable risk looms

Apr 15, 2025 with John Gedmark

Key Points

  • Astranis signs $100 million-plus geostationary satellite contract with Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom to provide backup communications independent of undersea cables.
  • Pentagon is buying the same commercial satellite design from Astranis's production line, giving the military advanced capability at a fraction of dedicated military program costs.
  • Astranis holds a NASA study contract on lunar communications infrastructure as the U.S. races China for the lunar south pole's water ice and control of the solar system gateway.
Astranis signs geostationary satellite deal with Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom as undersea cable risk looms

Summary

Astranis has signed a geostationary satellite contract with Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan's largest telco, with roughly a $30 billion market cap and $7–8 billion in annual revenue. The deal has been in the works for at least 12 to 18 months and sits in the $100 million-plus range — the kind of enterprise sale that involves aligning technical teams on satellite specs, network architecture, and commercial terms before anything gets signed.

The strategic logic is straightforward: Chunghwa manages Taiwan's undersea cables, cell tower networks, and government satellite connectivity. A single geostationary satellite parked over the island gives the country an off-island communications relay — meaning if every fiber line gets cut, Taiwan can still talk to the outside world. That is the explicit use case Astranis CEO John Gedmark describes for this satellite.

Why GEO, not LEO

Astranis was founded nearly nine years ago with a single thesis: apply modern small-satellite technology to geostationary orbit, a market that had seen almost no design innovation. The GEO satellite market runs at roughly $15 billion per year in launches, but historically those were buses the size of a double-decker bus costing hundreds of millions commercially and over $1 billion — sometimes multiple billions — on the military side. Astranis builds a smaller, cheaper alternative using ion thrusters (fuelled by xenon gas stored in tanks roughly the size of scuba cylinders) to propel the satellite from the transfer orbit where the rocket drops it to its final position roughly 100 times farther from Earth than LEO, or about a tenth of the way to the moon.

The company has now signed contracts for more than 10 commercial satellites and has active U.S. government defense programs in work. SpaceX's Falcon 9 lowered launch costs enough to make the business viable, but Gedmark also flags orbital transfer vehicles — he names Impulse Space specifically — as a growing part of the stack that can shorten time-to-orbit and extend satellite operational life by reducing onboard fuel consumption.

The enterprise product

For telecoms like Chunghwa, Astranis provides trunking and backhaul: high-capacity data pipes and connectivity for remote cell towers that would otherwise require fiber runs that don't make economic sense. The product is sold as dedicated capacity on guaranteed SLAs — always-on, exclusive bandwidth rather than shared consumer satellite service. Customers also get full visibility into their network traffic and control over where data lands, which matters for governments worried about sensitive traffic transiting foreign infrastructure.

To manage scope creep on hardware that can't be patched over a weekend, Astranis keeps a standard modular design with limited plug-and-play configurations. Customization beyond that gets declined — Gedmark is direct that full bespoke builds would blow past any reasonable contract value.

Dual-use and defense overlap

The U.S. DoD is buying off the same commercial production line, which lets the Pentagon access capable satellites at a fraction of what a dedicated military program would cost. Gedmark argues Taiwan's decision to work with Astranis was partly informed by seeing those U.S. military contracts — the satellite Taiwan is buying is the same one the DoD wants, not a stripped-down commercial variant.

Gedmark expects the civil-military boundary in U.S. space to keep compressing, partly in response to China operating with no such boundary at all between its military, civil, and commercial space programs.

The lunar race

Gedmark closes with what he frames as an underreported strategic risk: a concrete U.S.-China race for the permanently shadowed craters at the lunar south pole, which contain water ice that can be converted into rocket fuel. Whoever establishes a permanent base there first effectively controls the stepping stone to the rest of the solar system. China recently completed a lunar sample-return mission that demonstrates the core technologies needed for sustained human operations on the surface. Gedmark expects incoming NASA administrator Jared Isaacman, once Senate-confirmed, to elevate this as a national priority, and anticipates closer coordination between NASA and Space Force — the latter of which he says now has a clearer mandate under the Trump administration to counter Chinese activity in space.

Astranis already holds an early NASA study contract on lunar communications infrastructure, which would replicate for the moon the same GEO connectivity architecture it is building for Earth.